



# Health Reform: Why Now, Why Here, and Some *Big* Choices

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
# Overview

- Why Now
- Visions Before You
- Some Implications of the Visions
- Specific choices made by some states
- Specific proposals on your table
- Emerging Consensus?
- National Rumblings, Rumors, and campaigns
- Decisions to make

# Why Are We Here?

- 3 Health System Problems
  - Low value for dollar
  - Mediocre and uneven quality
  - Inequitable access
- Problems are Serious
- Problems are Linked
- Problems are Festering from Neglect
- Neglect of this set of problems is immoral

# Percent of median family income required to buy family health insurance




Source: Author's calculations, using KFF and AHRQ premium data, CPS income data.

# Labor Market Realities

<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Family premium/Median wage</b>
<b>Physician</b>	<b>7.9%</b>
<b>History professor</b>	<b>14.8%</b>
<b>Secretary</b>	<b>30.9%</b>
<b>Carpenter</b>	<b>25.6%</b>
<b>Cook</b>	<b>50.0%</b>

Source: KFF premium and BLS wage data, 2004.

# Premium Payments v. GDP Growth Rate



Source: NIPA, BEA/Commerce Dept.

# Compared to Other Countries

- #1 in spending, share of GDP, per capita
- #37 (by WHO) on overall system performance, next to Slovenia and Costa Rica
  - Life expectancy, child survival, fairness, responsiveness, health outcomes

*American health care  
"gets it right"  
54.9%  
of the time.*


McGlynn EA, Asch SM, Adams J, et al. The quality of health care delivered to adults in the United States. *N Engl J Med* 2003; 348(26):2635-45 (June 26).

**Source: Brent James, Intermountain Health Care,  
Presentation to state legislators, March 24,2007**



# US Overuses interventionist technological procedures

Figure 2.1. Utilisation rates of revascularisation procedures and relative level of IHD



IHD: Ischaemic heart disease.

Note: Age-standardised IHD mortality rates are used as a proxy for relative levels of IHD. Belgium, Australia, Spain (1995); Denmark, Finland, Sweden (1996); Canada, Germany, Greece, United Kingdom, United States (1997); Italy: mortality (1995) and revascularisations (1996); Norway: CABG (1996), PTCA (1998), mortality (1995). Data standardised to the European population aged 40 and over.

Source: Revascularisations: see Table 2.4. IHD mortality: OECD Health Database (2002).

***50+% of all resource expenditures in  
hospitals is  
quality-associated waste:***

- recovering from preventable foul-ups*
- building unusable products*
- providing unnecessary treatments*
- simple inefficiency*

Andersen, G. 1991  
James BC et al., 2006

**Source: Brent James, Intermountain Health Care,  
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# Annual Number of Excess Deaths

- Medical Errors in Hospitals: 98,000
- Poor Quality: 42,000-79,000
- Diabetes (for comparison): 73,000

# Inequitable Access

- Census reduced national estimates from 47m to 45m (770k in Colorado)
- Insurance is key to access
- Insurance is income-related
  - Income < 25k are 25% uninsured
  - Income > 75k are 8% uninsured
- Social Cost is high
  - IOM estimates 18-20k premature deaths yearly
  - IOM says cost of uninsured = cost of subsidies within coverage expansion

# Competing Visions

- The Market is Perfect, and freed from current and all regulations, will solve all problems
- The Market is Evil, so Government alone must and can solve all problems
- Health markets are flawed but powerful
  - Public and private forces must align interests and incentives to reach efficiency and Justice


# “Pure” Market Solutions

- End insurance regulation
- End benefit mandates
- End government subsidy programs

# Competition in Insurance Markets

- Price and Quality
- Standard assumption is  $P$  depends on  $Q$
- Quality in HI determined by:
  - services covered/excluded
  - cost-sharing
  - providers' quality, efficiency and prices

# Price and quality in ice cream






# Problems with HI Markets


- Price and quality signals are muddled by risk selection
- Risk selection varies with comprehensiveness
- Lower risk prefer lower comprehensiveness, higher risk need/prefer more coverage
- So, Price is also a function of the average risk of enrollees in specific insurance product
- Sellers not always willing to sell to next customer

# Price and quality in HI



**AV** IFF everyone buys each policy


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# Price and quality in HI



**AV** IFF everyone buys each policy  
**RS** if risks sort themselves, but all buy at CR  
 $P_L < P_H$  if underwriting/pricing variance allowed

# Promoting Different Types of Competition in Insurance Markets

- NO regulation: value added for healthy by segmenting/excluding higher risks
  - Maximum product variation
- Heavier regulation: value added mostly through more efficient provider networks, less product variation
- Concept of fairness, priorities differ

# What do we know about the non-group market?

- Loads are much higher (15-30%)
- Take-up rate much lower (25% vs. 90%)
- Search costs are high
  - Variance in premium \ benefit offers is large
- It works for some/many/most?
- It cannot work well for seriously ill, low income
- Reforms produce large tradeoffs
- There is market failure in the inability of low risk to find policies offered at prices near their  $E[c]$

# Why State Reforms Passed

- Small business owners were outraged
  - Premium inflation
  - Instability of insurance offers
- Non-group insurance stories are harsh, sad, and true
  - Adverse selection is a real threat
  - Selection management is profitable
  - Insurers do what they are allowed to do
- Insurance industry historically preferred State regulation to Federal

# “Pure” Government Solution

- Government becomes sole insurer and payer
- Wholly tax financed
- Technically could work
- Issues
  - Trust?
  - Effectiveness in improving value per dollar?
  - Can major efficiencies be achieved any other way?
  - Philosophy of Solidarity vs. Personal + Shared Responsibility



# Recent choices by some states

- Massachusetts, Gov. Schwarzenegger
  - Linked personal and shared responsibility
    - Shared includes making marketplace
    - Shared includes spreading financing burden
    - Shared must address cost growth as well
- Ambitious but cautious
  - VT, IL, PA (all *but* mandates)
- The best they can right now
  - AR, NM, WV
- Commissions + talk
  - WA, OK, MN, NJ, NY

# Choices on Your Table

- Better Health Care for Colorado
  - New market + subsidies, public expansion, seamless
- Solutions for a Healthy Colorado
  - Subsidies plus mandate, SBP, new market rules
- A Plan for Covering Coloradans
  - “emerging consensus” plan
- Colorado Health Services Program
  - Thoughtful single payer
    - Quality related payment reforms

# Some National Conversations

- Wyden (D-OR) and Bennett (R-UT)
  - Baird (D-WA) and Emerson (R-MO)
- Wal-Mart – SEIU, Wal-Mart – BRT – AARP
- FAH, ERIC
- President Bush
- Presidential Campaigns

# Emerging Consensus?

- Personal + Shared Responsibility
  - Personal responsibility for health and insurance
  - Shared responsibility for:
    - Marketplace
    - Subsidies
    - Stewardship of health delivery system
- More Efficient Delivery System
  - Information + Incentives + Comparative Assessment

# Decisions Before You

- Is status quo reality and trajectory acceptable?
- Assess power and limits of markets IN COLORADO
  - restructure where necessary
- There is no “Perfect” approach
- Select policies consistent with your willingness to invest Colorado’s resources
- Long run success requires delivery system reform
- Long run success requires community, trust, adaptability and personal + shared responsibility